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Applying the Natural Law 
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I n discussions of liberty and conscientious objec-tion very often issues of a religious and/or aesthet-
ic nature -which are outside the scope of morality 
proper - are intermingled with, or take the place 
of, moral arguments. For this reason, I would sug-
gest, as a kind of heuristic device, that we temporar-
ily purloin Kierkegaard's distinction between the 
aesthetic, ethical and religious spheres, using it at 
the outset to cull out some extrinsic considerations 
which can prevent us from coming to terms with 
the strictly ethical issues in conscientious objection. 
For example, with regard to liberty, there is a reli-
gious interpretation, advanced by Kierkegaard, ac-
cording to which freedom is contradistinguished not 
from necessity, but from sin. Liberty for the Christian 
is essentially a state of grace and salvation, an inter· 
pretation which may be concomitant and compatible 
with political oppression or insuperable, practical ob-
stacles to personal development or activity. With re· 
gard to the-aesthetic (in the wide sense), we find .the 
common concept of liberty as the "ability to preserve 
one's natUre and do what one likes without unneces-
sary obstacles." This interpretation receives elabora-
tion as a philosophical theory in the work of Hobbes 
and others. Standing in the middle, as an example of 
a strictly moral approach to liberty, is Immanuel 
Kant's characterization of liberty as autonomy, the 
rational self-determination of persons coordinated 
into a kind of moral republic or "kingdom of ends." 
As we consider the case of conscientious objec-
tion, it seems evident that in the main, extenuating 
factors and exculpating circUJDstances which have 
justified conscientious objection in the United States 
have traditionally been of a religious nature. The 
successful American Christian conscientious objector 
typically appeais to his denomination's pacifist inter-
pretation ·of Gospel spirituality (as with the Quak-
ers), or to the complete independence of the "King-
dom of God" from secular authority (as with the Je-
hovah's Witneses). It is also possible for mainline 
Catholics and Protestants to appeal to their own 
pacifist interpretation, or the interpretation of their 
faith subcommunity, as a justification for their stand 
vis-a-vis war. But it is remarkable that for both draft-
board adjudicators and anti-draft appellants, specifi-
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cally moral objections and arguments seem to be ex-
cluded by a kind of common consent. The venerable 
hosts of utilitarians, deontologists, natural law theo-
rists, etc. seem constrained to stand on the sidelines 
when it comes to actual, practical, personal con-
frontations with one's draft board. 
Are there any powerful, persuasive and germane 
arguments of a purely moral nature sufficiently prac-
tical and applicable to serve to exonerate an individ-
ual from military combat service? In addressing this 
question, we must first distinguish between ap-
proaches which emphasize a subjective decision-pro-
cedure- e.g., the negative Golden Rule that one 
should not choose to do anything to anyone that he 
would be unwilling for that person to do to him -
and approaches which are based on ostensibly more 
objective considerations. Prima facie it would seem 
that an objective norm such as "natural law," if it 
could point to certain hard and publicly ascertainable 
facts which are also indisputably common values, 
woU!ld be a solid buttress against the welter of coun-
terpoised "facts" that any government can muster up 
in justifying mobilization and war and the drafting of 
recruits for war. 
Natural law· has at certain historical confluences 
been simply identified with the positive law - e.g., 
the . "natural law" of· subjection of slaves to masters 
in eras when slavery was officially condoned, the 
"natural" domination of husband over wife, etc. But 
it has also been at times the indispensable socio-po-
litical lever for transcending the oppression of posi-
tive laws. For example the natural law that govern-
ment should be for the sake of, and/or with the con-
sent of, the people governed has been the means of 
justifying and instigating the overthrow of tyrannies. 
In that particular species of oppression in which an 
individual is being constrained unjustly to fight in a 
war, or constrained to fight in an unjust war, or con-
strained to fight in any war in a context wherein no 
war can conceivably be justified - can an appeal to 
natural law be effective? 
An initial elimination of one approach seems fea-
sible: When it comes to conscientious objection, it 
seems that an appeal to the law of "killing only for 
self-defense" would be, in the last analysis, too in· 
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conclusive: there is such an imposing array of actual 
or potential hostile intentions in the international 
arena that a protective or suspicious government can 
always argue (orcibly that it is fighting a war of self-
defense, or initiating a preemptive war to obviate 
the necessity of defending against inevitable and im-
minent aggression, or fighting not against specifically 
military aggression but against, e.g., economic ag-
gression which has the potential of destroying its 
subsistence as a nation. 
As one considers the applicability of natural law 
theory to the issue in question, the first hurdle that 
presents itself is, of course, the well known lack of 
consensus, even among practitioners of natural law 
themselves, as to which concept of "nature" and/or 
"natural law" an appeal should be made. There are 
some who would even be satisfied with the absolute-
ly vague and completely innocuous principle of syn-
deresis, "good is to be done and evil is to be avoid-
ed," which is highly unlikely to move any hearts at 
the military conscription establishments! Faced with 
this de facto lack of consensus, I would like to sug-
gest in the interim {while pathfinders are still 
searching for some path. to consensus) that two 
somewhat specific tenets of traditional natural law 
theories (certainly more specific than synderesis) are 
eminently applicable to the issue of conscientious 
objection:-
!) Universal human brotherhood (characteristic 
especially of the stoicism of Epictetus), which rela-
tivizes all struggles of ascendancy of one national, 
political, ethnic or religious group over another, and 
disallows any thought of annihilating, or even subju-
gating, any group, is inherently incompatible with 
wars which aim at such subordination or annihilat-
ing, or even subjecting, any group is inherently in-
compatible with wars which aim at such subordina-
tion or annihilation. (The recent "Eve" hypothesis 
concerning the descent of the species from a single 
woman gives genetic substantiation to this concept; 
and the Treaty on Genocide, recently and belatedly 
ratified by the U.S. Congress, might be taken as the 
final, practical recognition of this principle in the 
sphere of contemporary international law.) Cases in 
point might be wars or campaigns directed against 
Kurds, Jews or Palestinians, Hindus, Iraqis or Irani-
ans at present; and in the past, U.S. intervention in 
Vietnam to orchestrate the victory of one political 
faction over the other would be objectionable for 
similar reasons, unless it could have been shown 
that one of the factions had been aiming at the 
forcible extermination of the other. 
2) The law of self·preservation, universally taken 
for granted and almost a truism, receives particular 
emphasis in the Thomistic version of .natural law, 
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which emphasizes the teleology of aU natural beings 
toward maintaining and fostering their existence. In 
previous times, this law would not have been of 
paramount importance for conscientious objection, 
because war was considered a major, last-resort 
means of self-preservation against a species of war it-
self, i.e., against nuclear war. Nuclear war, at a cer-
tain level of firepower, and in probable conjunction 
with a "nuclear winter," has the potential of annihi-
lating the human species, as well as aU other species 
of life on the planet. And since at present even a lim-
ited or regional war could conceivably expand (as has 
happened in the past) into a worldwide conflagra-
tion, war as an instrument for the resolution of con-
flicts must be viewed as a quaint luxury· for past gen-
erations. With the widespread recognition of such 
possibilities and of such dangers in the last decade, a 
timely appeal to the fundamental and ineluctable law 
of self-preservation of the species, and of all the na-
tionalities or peoples encompassed by the species, 
should be both credible and powerful. 
With deference to those who are anxious to avoid 
any "naturalistic fallacies", we might observe that 
both the above-mentioned laws - the law of alle-
giance to the human species as a whole, and the law 
of self-preservation - are not only facts of existence 
and continued existence, but also values, recognized 
as commendable and rational at least in theory if not 
always in practice by the vast majority of people of 
the world. It is not this convergence of the fact and 
value which should be considered paradoxical, but 
rather the artificial separation of fact from value in 
the first place (which has instigated in philosophical 
discourse a multiplication of "naturalistic fallacies"). 
With a view to possible allegations of "objec-
tivism," it should also be observed that the appeals 
made both to universal brotherhood and to species 
self-preservation give due respect to the elements of 
subjectivity and historicity - and in fact it is pre-
cisely human social and political and technological 
evolution that gives these long-standing natural laws, 
recognized for millenia, a new and emphatic persua-
sive force in the present era. 
One cannot, of course, predict how persuasive 
such arguments from natural law might be with the 
various officials an individual conscientious objector 
might have to confront. But possibly we have now 
sufficiently transcended our long-standing ignorance 
of the terminal consequences and side-effects of nu-
clear attacJcs, and possibly we have even made suffi-
cient advances beyond the narrow provincialism of 
us-against-them, so that such "merely ethical" con-
siderations might have as much or more force than 
the strictly religious grounds that were considered 
valid in past wars and past conscriptions. ~ 
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